Toggle Main Menu Toggle Search

Open Access padlockePrints

Bankruptcy in the UK: Do managers talk the talk before walking the walk?

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Yousry AhmedORCiD

Downloads


Licence

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).


Abstract

This study examines whether managers employ the annual report textual disclosures as a conduit to communicate the probability of future corporate bankruptcy or to intentionally mislead stakeholders due to impression management incentives. We conduct various examinations around the information content of the tone conveyed by textual disclosures in the unstructured UK annual reports and the probability of corporate bankruptcy. We document that firms that communicate a more net positive tone are associated with lower bankruptcy risk. Importantly, this association is found to be stronger for firms whose managers have a lower incentive to mislead investors due to better board monitoring, stringent stock market regulation, and Big 4 audits. We also offer complementary evidence that firms conveying a more net positive tone exhibit higher future performance and earnings persistence, and lower future performance volatility. These firms are also less likely to exhibit extreme corporate policies and receive a qualified auditor’s opinion. Overall, this study sheds light on whether managers tend to inform or misinform (bury their heads in the sand) about corporate bankruptcy.


Publication metadata

Author(s): Ahmed Y, Elsayed M, Xu B

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: British Journal of Management

Year: 2024

Pages: epub ahead of print

Online publication date: 25/02/2024

Acceptance date: 30/01/2024

Date deposited: 04/02/2024

ISSN (print): 1045-3172

ISSN (electronic): 1467-8551

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12804

DOI: 10.1111/1467-8551.12804

ePrints DOI: 10.57711/r6mv-2431


Altmetrics

Altmetrics provided by Altmetric


Share