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Lookup NU author(s): Professor Peter Ryan
A number of recent voting schemes provide the property of voter verifiability: voters can confirm that their vote is accurately counted in the tally. The Farnel type voting schemes are based on the observation that to achieve voter-verifiability it is not necessary for the voter to carry away a receipt corresponding to their own vote. The Farnel approach then is to provide voters, when they cast their vote, with copies of receipts of one or more randomly selected, previous cast votes. This idea has a number of attractive features: ballot secrecy is achieved \emph{up front} and does not have to be provided by anonymising mixes etc during tabulation. In fact, plaintext receipts can be used in contrast to the encrypted receipts of many other voter-verifiable schemes. Furthermore, any fears that voters might have that their vote is not truly concealed in an encrypted receipt are mitigated. The Farnel mechanism also mitigates randomization style attacks. In this paper we explore some enhancements to the original Farnel scheme and ways that the Farnel concept can be combined with some existing voter-verifiable schemes, namely Pr\^et-\`a-Voter, ThreeBallot, and Randell-Ryan.
Author(s): Araujo R, Ryan PYA
Publication type: Report
Publication status: Published
Series Title: School of Computing Science Technical Report Series
Year: 2008
Pages: 25
Print publication date: 01/02/2008
Source Publication Date: February 2008
Report Number: 1069
Institution: School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Place Published: Newcastle upon Tyne
URL: http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/publications/trs/papers/1069.pdf
